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The origin, function and disappearance of collective production units (Harrasehs) in rural areas of Iran

Entstehung und Zerfall von kollektiven Produktionseinheiten (Harasseh) im ländlichen Iran

By S. Amini*

1. Introduction

Subsequent to land redistribution in Iran**, one is confronted with the gradual disappearance of the traditional mode of peasant collective production units in rural areas. Due to these developments, the objectives of the present study are to clarify and explain the origin, function and decline of these production units. Because of the lack of historical information regarding wehen and how such productive units came into existence (5), the methodological procedure employed will attempt to extrapolate their origin utilizing data pertaining to the function and decline of these units.

Numerous examples of descriptive research dealing with these peasant production units can be found in literature (2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11). However a general analysis concerned with the various socio-economic relations of the peasants productive units is lacking. The present longitudinal research, conducted between 1970—1978, is an empirical study of three southern Iranian villages, which deals specifically with the production units and the ongoing socio-economic relations and the changes currently taking place with coincide with the restructuring of rural communities due to land redistribution. By explaining the causes of the disappearance and the changes in the posession of agricultural land, we hope to also clarify the origin of the traditional mode of peasant production units.

* Dr. S. Amini, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Kontaktstudienzentrum des Fachbereichs Internationale Agrarwirtschaft der Gesamthochschule Kassel, Steinstraße 19, 3430 Witzenhausen 1.

** Land reform in Iran was instituted by governmental action in 1962 and ended in 1972. This paper does not deal with land reform and its concomitant changes as brought about externally governmental action but rather the inherent changes which occurred through the redistribution of the land itself.

2. Definitions

These production units have evolved over the centuries in Iran as complex social organizations for agricultural production with particular cultivation and water rights and semi-structrued farm management. They are known in various sections of the country as BONEH (central provinces); SAHRA (north-east provinces); DJUGH (western provinces); KOTEH (south-western provinces); . . .; and Harraseh (south and south-eastern provinces*). With a few exception (i.e. north Gilan and Mazandaran, the north-west Azarbayjan provinces and the western provinces of Kermanshahan) these production units are found throughout the country. Thus, although there are terminological variations and in some respects slight organizational differences, these are units of collective or group farming composed of landless share-croppers with certain rights of land usage.

The differences among these collective production units are based upon two major factors, irrigation rights and labor.

Boneh, as defined by Khosrovi (4), stresses labor-use in the various villages included under this system. The farming activities are carried out jointly by four to six share-croppers. However, the components of the labor unit and the area farmed may change from year to year. All phases of farming are performed by the members of the production unit; thus members of the unit are treated equally, with one exception: each production unit has a "leader" (Sarharrseh or Sarboneh), chosen by the landlord, who fulfills a major function due to his agricultural knowledge or ability to run the common work. This type of collective farming was encouraged by absentee landowners because of the relative ease with which they could deal with and control the share-croppers.

Another definition of the Harraseh, as defined by Safi-Nedjad (10), is based on the duration of the agreement (usually one year), and the land usage rights (Haghe Nasaq) as well as on the water rights (Haqqabeh). The irrigation rights as a disseparable part of the share-cropping system (8) demanded extensive teamwork in the utilization of the village water resources, most importantly, in the digging and maintenace of the under-ground water channels (qanats) and river irrigation.

In attempting to explain the origin of the Harraseh system, current researches generally have stressed either the labor unit (Khosrovi, K., 1976) or the water rights (Safi-Nedjab, 1976), depending upon where the research has been conducted. These approaches, however, may be misleading. For example, when basing the origin of the Harraseh system on water use, conclusions tend to stress the fact that there is a relation between the origin of the Harraseh and climatic conditions in Iran and that this form of production unit has developed in areas where water is a scarce resource. These findings are subject to certain shortcomings: (i) in the northern sections of the country, annual rainfall averages approximately 1,200 mm; however, this distribution is widely uneven which results in areas that are exceedingly dry. Nevertheless, there are no collective production units to be found in these sections of the country; and (ii) more importantly, since climatic conditions have not drastically been altered, theories of this type do not adequately explain the decline of the Harraseh in general.

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* In this paper all of these peasant collective production units will be referred to as Harraseh.

Thus we feel that the most important common denominator in all existing definitions and findings regarding the Harraseh system is the ownership system in the rural life. Landlessness of the peasants was the precursor to the share-cropping system which resulted in the necessity of the formation of collective production units. There were, however, various sections of the country where landlessness did not result in the formation of collective production units (1). To explain this, our research shows that two types of relation between landlord and share-cropper existed in Iran. Firstly, land which was divided into individual plots and worked annually by a given peasant. Secondly, land held by a landlord with sufficient power to annually rotate the peasants, thus they did not work the same land continuously. It was only in this latter condition that Harrasehs were found to exist. Since the land was owned by the landlord and the peasants only had land usage rights (7), a complete understanding of the Iranian village environment is dependent upon a thorough insight into the share-cropping system because the socio-economic life of the village was determined and governed by the nature of the landlord-share-cropper relationship. As was previously stated, we do not intend to investigate the system of share-cropping itself, however it must be noted that the share-cropping system seemed to be the only possibility for combining the capital of the landlord, on the one hand, and the labor of the peasants, on the other, for functional land usage given the existing technological conditions.

3. Tree Iranian Villages

The present study was carried out in three villages of Fars, as southern province in Iran.

BAND-E-AMIR was the first village to be observed. This 809 hectare village was composed of 92 small-holders and share-croppers with land-holdings ranging from .5—50 hectares of land resulting in a mixed form of agarian agriculture (1).

Since Band-e-Amir consisted of small-holders the first stage of land redistribution; which limited land ownership by individuals to one village or its equivalent; as instituted by the government, did not affect the village. During the second stage of land redistribution some of the larger land-holders, according to the laws of agarian reform, redistributed various portions of their holding to the share-croppers. Thus the village was composed of entirely small-holders with extreme variations in the actual size of the holdings.

Of significance to the village was the availability of a more than adequate water source from the Kor river, the largest river in Fars. Due to this ample water supply, a small plot of land in Band-eAmir could be considered more valuable than an entire village in a dry area of the country. This was also a major inducement for high rates of land transfers through purchasing and selling.

Of major importance to our study was the fact that at no time did peasant collective production units exist. In addition, the extreme differentiation in the size of the individual holdings, resulting in inequality between the holders, precluded any type of peasant collective production units. Thus, the small-holding system did not allow for the development of Harrasehs as found in other villages where landlessness of peasants was prominant.

HOSSAIN-ABAD was the second village to be observed. This 152 hectare village

was composed of 31 peasants each cultivating approximately 4.5 hectares of land.

Like Band-e-Amir, this village was not affected by the first stage of land redistribution. However, unlike Band-e-Amir, the peasants had land usage rights on approximately the same size holdings. In addition, since there was no differentiation in the size of the plots cultivated, peasant collective production units existed. In this instance there were seven Harrasehs with four members each and one additional three-member Harraseh.

Changes occurred with the second stage of land redistribution. It was during this stage that the peasants were given ownership to the land, thus, becoming small-holders. Gradually the Harrasehs began to disappear and after three years no peasant collective production units existed.

Thus the change from landlessness to a small-holding system precluded the maintenance of the Harrasehs, as was found in the previous village. In order to explain this process of change, one additional village will be considered.

Zangi-Abad, for three reasons, was considered to be the most important village for the purpose of our study: (i) land redistribution has undergone two phases of change; which is important in regards to the research objective of ascertaining how changes occurred; (ii) the organization of the production units found in this village corresponds closely to the ideal type of the Harraseh; and, (iii) this village was the object of previous research in 1970—1971 (1).

For the past 250 years the village of Zangi-Abad has been a religious VAQF*. The landlord in vaqf villages is referred to as MOTOVALLI (administrator). His functions as landlord (Motavalli) are identical to those of landlords in other villages except that a portion of the product is given to him and a portion is given to religious organizations for purposes of welfare, charity, or religious education. For example, if the Motavalli is to receive onefourth of the portion (this amount varies depending upon what crop is cultivated), the division of this portion would be as follows: 45% religious and charity purposes, 20% Motavalli, 17% administration and registration, 15% tax and 3% miscellaneous. This religious endowment has no significance for the present study because the share-cropping system in the village was conducted in the same manner as share-cropping found elsewhere and until 1968 no basic changes had been made.

The village, before land redistribution, consisted of 1512 hectares of cultivatable land, divided equally into two sections, each containing three DANGS**. Each half of the village had 756 hectares of land and 54 share-croppers, of these, every six made up one agricultural production unit with the agricultural output divided equally between them. Thus, there was a total of 18 productive units in the village, 9 in each half (see Figure 1). The land cultivated by the peasants in each production unit did not remain constant but changed almost annually due to land reallocation.

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* Land referred to as a religious vagf-i 'amm) is any land enendowed for religious and public purposes. In addition to these charitable ougaf (pl.) there are also private or personal ougaf (vaqf-i khass) which consist of land put aside for some private purpose.

** A dang is one-sixth part of any piece of real estate.

The village was divided into 18 productive units. This number was not an accidental result but rather based on water usage rights which developed over the years. Water for the village was obtained from the Sevand River and in a 24 hour period, each half of the village received a 12 hour allocation which was then divided into a rotating nine day schedule. In other words, each of the 9 production units in both halves of the village received 12 hours of water every 9 days.
The land was cultivated by equal participation of the peasants composing each production unit. In other words, each of the peasants contributed equal amounts of



Fig. 1: Organizational Chart of Zangi-Abad
H = Harraseh (Collective Production Unit)
P = Peasant
* = Family names of the Motavalli's in each half of the village

labor and animal time (land, water and seed were provided by the landlord). The supervision of the land cultivation in each unit was untertaken by one of the more experienced elder members (referred to as SARHARRASEH or SARBONEH), who in turn fell into the hierarchical structure below the village head (KADKODA or MOBASHER), see Figure 2.

Although the previous figure depicts a hierarchical system, all products were divided equally between the six production unit members. This includes the position of Sarharraseh, which is an honorary one and to which no material privileges or shares are awarded.

Before farm mechanization and tractor use, each peasant, at the beginning of the production year (generally in autumn) contributed the use of one ox (GAV) for ploughing purposes. Therefore, with six peasants in each unit, there were three pairs of oxen available for land cultivation. In addition, out of the total of 1512 hectares in the village, each unit was given annually 84 hectares, of which only 15—20 hectares were cultivated, the remainder was left to fallow. The allocation of the land was through the lottery (PESHK) system. Thus, with the commencement of the cultivation season the land was divided into nine equal plots, each unit then obtain, through a lottery, its land area for the farming year. Because this method was used the land cultivated by each unit changed annually. The lottery system was also used to determine the order of irrigation of the nine units in each half of the village.

Due to rice cultivation labor was very intensive even though, owing to annual fallow, the actual land utilization was minimal. All water was used for rice, wheat and barley cultivation. However, the latters were of secondary importance and used strictly for family consumption. With the introduction of tractors prior to the land redistribution, it was possible to increase the area of land cultivated and simultaneously increase the production of wheat and barley and introduce the cultivation of sugarbeets. Thus, by the time land redistribution was implemented each unit was cultivating approximately 36 hectares of land, rice cultivation had ceased and water was applied entirely to the cultivation of wheat, barley and sugarbeets.

As was previously stated, there was no actual stratification of the peasants in the production units. All were required to participate equally in providing labor requirements and share the output equally. No division of labor existed except for controlling the irrigation of crops. In this regard, the Sarharraseh appointed two of the members to be responsible for assuring proper irrigation. These two individuals were referred to as ABYAR and DamABYAR (the one who cares for water and his assistant, respectively).



Source:
Khosrovi, K. Sociologie de la campagne Iranienne. Université de Tehran. Faculté des Sciences Sociales et D'études cooperatives. No. 1, 2nd Edition, September 1976, p. 79.

Fig. 2: The Organization of One Production Unit Source: (4)

4. Zangi-Abad and the Second Stage of Land Reform

Although land redistribution in Iran began in January 1962 it was not worked out in Zangi-Abad until 1965*. The second stage of the land redistribution was meant to abolish the landlord-peasant regime through the transfer of land ownership to the peasants. However, in the case of charitable vaqf villages or farms ownership was not passed directly to the peasants; instead the land redistribution law stated that vaqf land was to be let to the occupying peasants on a 99 year lease. Thus, although the peasants in Zangi-Abad did not become owners, they did become independent tenants. Therefore, no longer owing allegiance to the landlord; instead, all necessary transactions were carried out through the vaqf administration (EDARE-E-VAQF).

Since the tenants were no longer responsible to the landlord, all previous services provided to the landlord by the peasants ceased. One of these services included the cleaning of The Sevand River which was used for the irrigation of crops. This lack of cleaning resulted in a decrease of water supply while simultaneously sugarbeet production increased, which required even more water compared with previous requirements. Due to these greater water needs, a change in the structure of the Harrasehs occurred. An increase in water supply meant that an increase in capital formation was needed, which could not be undertaken by one Harraseh composed of six members. Consequently, larger Harraseh were formed during the second stage of land redistribution, resulting in the formation of six new larger Harrasehs (see Figure 3).

As shown in Figure 3, every three of the previous Harrasehs were now formed into a new Harraseh in order to resolve the problems rising from the need to increase water supplies.

The voluntary organization of the new Harrasehs began one year after the land redistribution was introduced into the village. With the increased capital, semi-deep wells were dug by each new Harraseh which resulted in the water being supplied by both the river and the wells. Credit for the well digging was obtained from the government and sugarbeet factories. The distribution of the water for irrigation remained the same for the river supply while water ontained from the wells was divided between on a three days schedule among participating Harrasehs. With the additional water resources melon and vegetable, in conjunction with sugarbeet fields, were cultivated.

The socio-economic changes, which were the result of the land redistribution and the new rights of land usage did not affect the previous system of river irrigation and enabled it to continue, while simultaneously made it feasible to utilize that system in well irrigation, too. Previous to land redistribution the landlord was solely responsible for providing funds for investments (such as irrigation), however, there was a general tendency to avoid these investments by replacing them by peasant labor and services. Subsequent to land redistribution the peasants were responsible for such investments; thus it was necessary to restructure the Harraseh system in order to accumulate the needed capital for wellirrigation.

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* Charitable ougaf were exempted from the first stage of land redistribution.



Fig. 3. Reorganization of the Harrasehs in Zangi-Abad During the Second Stage of Land Redistribution

NH = New Harraseh
PH = Previous Harraseh
P = Peasant

When the present study was conducted in Zangi-Abad, certain characteristics of the Harrasehs could be determined:

1) An exclusive area of land was cultivated jointly by the six members of the Harraseh.
2) Irrigation was carried out jointly and equally by the members of the Harraseh.
3) Each member of the Harraseh contributed equally to the needed agricultural inputs including required labor.
4) All output (yield) was divided equally between the members of the Harraseh.
5) The members of the Harraseh werde equally subjected to all production risks incurred during the agricultural year.

As can be seen in (1—5) the members shared equally in the input/output and risks of agricultural production; there were no significant differences between the members of the Harraseh. This does not mean, however, that all peasants were equal. Differences arose in the size of animal herds, income and expenditures (these depended mainly on the size of the family).

One of the most important changes that took place in connection with the Harraseh system was the substitution of a monetary payment to the Edare-e-vaqf for the rental of the land instead of providing a payment in kind as was previously given to the Motavalli or landlord before the introduction of land redistribution. Although after land redistribution the actual area under cultivation did not substantially increase, the changes in irrigation provided the necessary water supply for the cultivation of sugarbeets. This cultivation was on a contractual arrangement between the Harraseh, on one side, and the sugarbeet factories at Marvdasht, on the other.

5. The Third Stage of Land Reform

With the implementation of the third stage of land reform the regulations affecting the distribution of land were more complex. Charitable vaqf were, in most cases, settled by tenancies but agreements were concluded only with those peasants who were members of a co-operative society. The tenancies were to be for 99 years for land which was considered to be vaqf-i 'amm (public charitable lands). Private of family vaqf (vaqf-i khass), according to Article Two of the Additional Articles of 17 January 1963, were sold to the occupant peasants (6). According to these regulations, peasants made yearly cash payments for a period of ten years, after which they became the legal owners of the land they cultivated. The annual payments were the same amount as the rent previously was. Thus, because Zangi-Abad had been vaqf-i khass, the villagers were no longer landless peasants but owners of the land. No need to say, this land redistribution law amendment was responsible for the most significant changes which took place in the village.

Although during 1965—1972 the Harraseh system has been restructured with a more complex organizational form, it had remained intact. However, when the third stage of the land redistribution was implemented, the Harrasehs began to disperse. This decline began during the first year after the third stage of land redistribution began, and some Harrasehs were completely abolished within two years. For others, the decline came about more slowly as shown in Figure 4.



Fig. 4. The Decline of One Harraseh in Zangi-Abad Between 1972 – 1977

In 1972, the Harraseh in Figure 4 has six members, but was splitted into two Harrasehs in 1973 with four and two members respectively. In 1973 the smaller, two member Harraseh was abolished, one member began farming individually and the other member was incorporated into another Harraseh. Thus, in 1974, there were two Harrasehs with two and three members respectively and one individual who farmed alone. In 1975, the two member Harraseh joined with a member from the three member Harraseh and the remaining two members joined again with the single individual, thus farming two Harrasehs with three members each. Again in 1976 there was a split of the two Harrasehs which resulted in three Harrasehs composed of two members each. In 1977 there was a further separation which resulted in four individual farmers and one Harraseh with only two members.

By 1977, out of the original 18 Harrasehs with six members each, only one remained intact, due mainly to kinship ties (this particular Harraseh was composed of close relatives, i.e. brothers, cousins). Even though the kinship ties did not prevent the eventual abolishment of this Harraseh, it did, however, impede its decline.

In 1977, only small Harrasehs could be observed with kinship or friendship ties among members, for example, two brothers or very close friends. By this time the Harraseh system in the village had declined to its minimum and will probably disappear totally in the near future.

Subsequent to the decline of the Harrasehs, a concomitant change in the irrigation system could also be observed. As was stated previously, the responsibility for maintaining the irrigation system was equally divided between the members of the Harrasehs. With their decline, however, this responsibility was no longer shared and consequently wells were not properly cared for. Members of the old Harrasehs began selling their shares in the wells to those who were financially more stable. The individuals who purchased the wells then began selling excess quantities of water. Those who sold their share in the wells became dependent upon the river for their irrigation needs or had to purchase water from those who owned the wells. Due to the lack of collective caring for the wells, there was a rapid increase in the number of wells dug by individuals. Prior to the third stage of land redistribution there were six semi-deep wells, one for each new Harraseh. However, in 1977, after the third stage of land redistribution, there were approximately 18 wells, all owned individually.

When attemting to ascertain which mode of production, individualized or collective farming, is more productive, one can see immediately that it is not an easy task. During the time in which the study was conducted, agricultural inputs (i.e. fertilizers, improved seeds, etc.) and mechanization were not widely implemented. Consequently, climatic variations were extremely important in determining annual yields; thus, there were immense annual fluctuations in the agricultural productions.

As can be seen in Figure 4, the peasants themselves could not satisfactorly determine which mode of production, individualized or collective, was more advantageous. After a poor crop yield the peasants would rejoin or reform a Harraseh, but following a good year they would leave the collective production unit. Interviews with the farmers revealed that the majority felt that labor problems existed, which were not evident prior to the introduction of the land redistribution. This is due to a difference in the position as a share-cropper against a tenant or owner status. The farmers felt that there, no longer, existed equal labor input

between the members of the Harraseh. Each felt as if he alone contributed the greatest amount of labor while receiving the same share of the crop as other Harraseh members.

Thus, it seems evident that the new tenant ownership statut of the peasants aided the decline of the Harraseh. The rapid spread of industrialization throughout the country also played a viable part in the decline. With industrialization, labor was now demanded in non-agricultural areas outside the village. The peasants now had a choice which was non-existent prior to land redistribution, they could remain in agricultural work or emigrate, while still maintaining land ownership, to urban areas in search for unskilled labor, which in the majority of cases, provided higher wages. This viable alternative to remaining in the agricultural sector also helped towards the abolishment of the Harraseh system.

6. Results

6.1 Origin

It is not possible to determine exactly the origin of the Harraseh. However until recently farming methods were basically the same as those used thousands of years ago. By investigating the decline of the share-cropping system it can be seen that there was also a concomitant disappeareance of the Harraseh. Therefore this paper contends that the Harraseh came into existence after the introduction of, and was dependent upon, share-cropping. Thus since the share-cropping system existed before the A.D. 635 Arab conquest in Iran, it is felt, although no historical evidence exists, that the Harraseh functioned since a least that time in history.

6.2 Functions

6.21 Economic

The economic role played by the Harraseh was vital to the survival of its members. The share-cropping peasant was constantly plagued by debt, which was one of the most difficult problems in the agricultural sector of the economy. He continually needed money to cover his operating expenses and, in winter, to meet his bare living needs until the next summer's harvest. In addition, the nature of the soil, the agricultural methods, the irrigation system, and the type of draft animals used were important factors in determining how much labor must be employed to cultivate the crops. In many instances, ploughing was done using the same type of wooden plough used 2,000 years ago. Sowing of the seed and weeding were done by hand. Harvesting, threshing, and winnowing of grain was also either done by hand or with animals. With the Harraseh system the members jointly contributed towards the needed agricultural inputs and labor, thus minimizing individual costs. In addition, maintenance of irrigation ditches was a major operation and quite costly. They had to be cleaned annually and kept in constant repair, the Harraseh system decreased individual obligations and furthermore gave each Harraseh prescriptive rights to a certain share of the water supply.

Thus economically the exploitation of land based on human labor and minimal capital use was served through the collective productive units.

6.22 Cultural. The collective production unit closely represented the ideal type of primary groups as depicted by Charles Horton Cooley. These groups were not solely formed as production units but also as cultural units. The division of both

labor and yield werde intimately combined with cultural ceremonies and habits. In addition, the relationships between the Harraseh members were also amalgamated through marriage and kinship ties.

6.23 Social and Political. The social structure of the Iranian village was to a large extent shaped by the domination of the landlord over the village life. The villages, more or less, became the private domain of the landlord who exercised tight control over the peasants. The Harraseh provided a means for this control. In most cases the landlords lived in urban centers but could manage and control the peasants who worked for them through the heads of each Harraseh. Not only did the peasants depend on the landlord for land but also for economic aid in times of need and for protection against external intervention. However this state of affairs was always more beneficial to the landlord because through exploitation of the peasants, he received much more form the village than he invested in it.
Due to the system of share-cropping, the landlord could evict the peasant from the land at any time. Thus, the only social security which the peasant possessed was provided through the Harraseh. Our research found the average age across all Harrasehs to be fairly equal, none were composed entirly of all young or old members. This formation allowed older members to work less than younger ones when necessary but nevertheless provided for them to receive an equal portion of the yield. This was also true in cases of personal illness or the inability to provide an equal share of production inputs (i.e. animals, seeds, etc.). In the instances of personal illness the remaining members would assume the additional resposibilities until the individual recovered. When production inputs could not be provided by a member due to disease or natural catastrophies he still retained his position in the Harraseh, repaid the debt when possible, but in the meantime received an equal portion of the yield.

6.3 Decline

Land redistribution has ended the share-cropping system in Iran and in its place we now find the familiy farm. Concomitantly along with individualized farming has been the substitution of a monetary system, although some payments in kind are still made. In addition, new forms of technology are being introduced which precludes the need for group farming.
Thus the Harraseh, which once was exceedingly important not only economically but also socially and culturally, is in the last stages of abolishment. Although in various areas of the country agricultural production in some froms of the Harraseh system might prove to be more productive than individualized.

Summary

Subsequent to land redistribution in Iran, the gradual disappearance of collective production units could be observed in rural areas of the country. Collective production units were complex social organisations for collective agricultural production under certain water rights, land usage rights and semi-structured farm management in share-cropping system. In attempting to explain the origin of the units, this longitudinal research was carried out between 1970 and 1978 mainly in three typical villages in south of Iran in the province Fars. The analysis has shown

clearly that neither the irrigation nor the labour problems were the dominating factors for the origin of such units, but the share-cropping system and the land ownership itself. Due to this, the units were disappeared in villages where land ownership was given to the peasants after land redistribution. In some villages, where the share-cropping system was changed to a lease system without giving the peasants the status of an owner, the units were developed and extended in a more or less complex way according to the externt of changes by the land redistribution.
As a result of the research, it can be concluded that the units came into existence after the introduction of, and was dependent upon, share-cropping. They have played a great social, cultural economic and political role in share-cropping system. They could not continue existing after the land redistribution without any help from outside, because they were not appropriate to the new system any more.

Zusammenfassung

Nach der Bodenverteilung im Iran konnte der Zerfall von kollektiven Produktionseinheiten in den ländlichen Gebieten beobachtet werden. Diese Einheiten waren komplexe sozioökonomische Organisationen im Dorf, die unter bestimmten Wasser- und Bodennutzungsrechten innerhalb des Teilbaus existierten. Diese Untersuchung, die sich zwischen 1970 und 1978 erstreckte, umfaßte drei typische südiranische Dörfer in der Provinz Fars. Sie zeigte, daß der Zerfall der Produktionseinheiten eine Folge der Bodenverteilung und die Entstehung von Eigentümerbauern war.
Die Untersuchung zeigte, daß weder die Wasserrechte noch Probleme der Arbeitskräfte die Hauptfaktoren waren, die zur Entstehung der Produktionseinheiten beigetragen hatten, sondern der Teilbau und die damit verbundenen Eigentumsverhältnisse. Nur in Dörfern, in denen die Bodenreform keine Eigentümerbauern, sondern Pächter hervorbrachte, entwickelten sich die Produktionseinheiten strukturell und paßten sich den neuen Verhältnissen an.

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